The Nether lands. by The Pennsylvania State University CiteSeerX Archives
EINDHOVEN UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY 
~e~artment  of Mathematics 
Memorandum 1980-01  " 
January 1980 
An approach to theorem proving 
on the basis of a typed lambda-calculus 
R.P.  Nederpelt 
University of Technology 
Department of Mathematics 
PO Box 513, Eindhoven 
The Nether  lands. An  approach  to theorem  proving on  the basis of  a  typed  lambda-calculus 
R.P.  Nederpelt 
(* 
Abstract and introduction 
 his paper describes a system of  typed  lambda-calculus  suited to 
representing mathematical  texts,  and discusses some  theorem proving aspects 
of  the system.  In part 1  a  formal expos6 is given of  the system,  with 
comments  on  the principles chosen.  A  natural manner  of rendering mathematical 
texts in the system will  be explained in part 2.  Finally,  in part 3  the 
system will  be  investigated as regards its potentials for  (partial) theorem 
proving. 
An  idea for a  "completely" formalized,  yet natural language  for 
expressing mathematical  texts was  conceived by  N.G.  de Bruijn.  In 1968 he 
developed  the mathematical  language Automath.  Automath  has since been 
extensively applied and tested on  numerous  mathematical  topics,  language 
theory has been  developed  for establishing its computational soundness,  and 
a computer  programme  has been  produced  for checking the formalized texts. 
For  Automath  and applications,  cf.  references  [I],  C21,  C81  and  [S]. 
Automath  is essentially a typed  lambda-calculus  presented in a 
modified  form  in order to  make  it more  accessible to the customer.  The 
underlying  typed lambda-calculus,  which  we  call A,  is relatively simple and 
in a  sense natural.  In contrast to types in the usual typed systems,  types 
in A  behave  like terms,  and do  not look  different to terms.  The  system h 
obeys  the same  "nice properties" as does Automath,  such as the Church-Rosser 
property,  unique  (strong) normalization and  closure  (see section 1.6). For 
language  theory of  Automath  and  A,  see C61,  C31  and  C41. 
Since  A  has a  simple,  transparent structure, it would  seem  promising  to 
investigate its practical theorem proving aspects.  However,  there has not 
been much  experience in this direction.  Some  considerations and comments, 
arising from  a  A-text  example presented  in this paper,  may  nevertheless be 
helpful for practical applications to theorem proving. 
(*I  Thanks  are due  to A.V.  Zimmermann  for remarks  concerning the use of  the 
English language. 1.  A  concise definition of  the system 
1.1.  Notations 
Like Automath,  A  uses notations that deviate from  lambda-calculus 
conventions.  For  Xx~  , x having  type A,  we  write  (AX  )B.  Instead of  (BA) , 
X 
i.e.  "function"  B  applied to "argument"  A,  we  write  (A6)B.  Here  6  is the 
signal for a functional application.  There  are two  main  reasons  for 
inverting the order of  function and  argument:  (1)  there is an analogy 
between  the dual operations "abstraction"  (leading from  B  to (AAx)B)  and 
"application"  (leading from  B  to  (A~)B)  1  (2) the inversion is very practical 
when  rendering mathematical texts by  means  of  A  (see e.g.  sections 2.6  and 
2.7). 
1.2.  Terms 
0  We  introduce the set T  of  (open) terms  by  the following recursive 
definition; the alphabet consists of  variables, brackets and  the symbols  A 
and  6. 
0  0 
(1) The  empty  term  is  a term of  T  ; each variable is a  term  of  T . 
0  (2) If A  and  B  E  T  and  if x is a variable,  then  (AX  )B and  (A6)B are terms 
X 
0  of  T  . 
  he  empty  term  is rendered invisibly;  examples  of  other terms are: 
x;  ( (6)Xx)y. 
0 
The  set T'  is  defined as the closed fragment  of  T , i.e.  the set of  all 
0  closed terms present  in T  ; a dosed term  is a term without  free variables. 
We say that G  is a subterm of  F,  if F and  G  are terms  and  G  occurs  in F. 
If, moreover,  the first symbol  occurring after G  in F  (if any)  is 6  or X, 
we  say that G  is a genuine  subterm of F' . (This definition implies that z 
and  (A  )x are  genuine subterms of  ( (A )  (X  1x6)  z, but  (A  )  is a subterm that 
Y  x  Y  Y 
is  not genuine. ) 
We  need  types to enable us  to attach "classes" to "objects":  if C  is a 
term  representing an object, then the type of  C  represents the class of 
that object.  In this context we  note that the empty  term  acts as a kind of 
class for all classes.  See also section 2.2. 
Formally,  we  define types as follows.  If  (BX  )  is a subterm of  term  A, 
X 
and  x  occurs as a variable in A  that is bound  by  the  X  mentioned,  then we  say that the type of the bound  x,  relative to A,  is B.  In the case that C  is a 
0  subterm of A  r  T  and C  ends in a variable x  (so C  -  Dx  for some  term  D) , 
where  x is bound  in A,  then the type of  C,  relative to  A,  is the 
concatenation of  D  and  the type of  x.  We  denote the type of C,  relative to 
A,  by TypACc],  or, when  no confusion is possible:  ~ypc~]. 
Example:  ~ypC(  (6)yXx)  ((xG)z)xl 5  ( (6)yhx)  ((x6)z)  (6)y. 
We  note that the types are not given beforehand as a separate set. They 
0  can be  calculated for some  subterms of  a term  in T  . In particular,  all 
genuine subterms of a closed term A  that end  in a variable,  have  a calculable 
0  type.  So  for A  c  T , TypA  is a partial function from  the set of all  subterms 
2  3 
of  A  to  TO.  The  iterates  of Typ  are denoted,  as usual, by  Typ  ,Typ , etc. 
1.4.  Reductions 
0 
We  provide T  with the usual reduction relations, called a-,  B-  and  n- 
reduction.  Since a-reduction  is a mere  renaming  of variables,  we  prefer to 
0  consider T  as being the set of all  a-equivalence  classes,  terms being a- 
equivalent if  and only if  one term reduces to  the other by  means  of a- 
reduction. 
0  The  essential reduction for T  is @-reduction (symbol:  ,  which is the 
formalization of  the application of a function to an argument.  It is induced 
X  by  the rule:  (A&) (BXx)C  >  C,  the latter term being the result of 
B  A 
(simultaneously)  substituting A  for all x's free in C.  We  also have  q- 
reduction,  induced by:  (Ahx) (x6)C >n C  if  x does not occur  freely in C. 
As usual,  conversion is the equivalence relation generated by  >  and  >  . 
B  11 
We  denote conversion by  the symbol -. 
1.5.  Strona functionalitv 
In systems of natural reasoning there is a natural desire to restrict 
the functional applicability.  In words:  (A6)B is only 
permitted  as a  subterm of a given F,  if  B  has a domain,  say C,  and  if  A  fits 
in domain  C.  We  shall express "having  a domain"  and  "fitting in" by  means  of 
the function Typ. 
C  Formally,  we  define:  F r  T  is straong~y  functionai!  if and only if the 
following condition applies:  for all  genuine subterms of  the form  (A6)B it 
holds that there exist a non-negative  number  n,  a variable y and  terms  C  and 
D  such that (i) 'I'ypnr~l  exists  and ~yp"C~1  - (CA  ID, 
Y 
(ii)  Typ  A  exists and Typ  A - C. 
We  define A  as the set of  all  closed terms that are strongly functional. 
Note:  For  theoretical purposes,  a much  weaker  form  of  functionality is  - 
sufficient to ensure the validity of  the "nice properties"  (see the next 
section). One  may  define "weakly functional" terms,  which  have  a  functional 
structure comparable  to that in usual typed lambda-calculuses.  The  weak 
system is helpful, proofs of  (strong) normalization  for A  being given with 
the aid of  the analogous proofs  for the weaker  system,  which  are relatively 
easy.  A  definition of weak  functionality is given in an appendix  to this 
paper;  for details, see C4J  and  161. 
1.6.  Properties of  A 
( 1  )  The  Church-Rosser  (or diamond) propctrty , i  .e .  : if A  E  A  reduces to 
B,  and  A  reduces  to C,  then B  and  C  have  a common  reduct. 
(2) CZosure,  i.e.:  if F  E  A,  then ~yp[F]  E  A;  moreover,  if  F reduces to 
GI  then G  c  A. 
(3)  (Unique) normalization,  i.e.:  if F  r  A,  then there is a unique 
normal  term H  such that F  reduces to H.  (H is normal  when  there is no  G  such 
that H  >  GorH  >  G.)  B  n 
(4) Strong normalization,  i.e.:  each reduction sequence  starting from  a 
strongly functional term,  terminates. 
For  proofs of  these theorems,  see C61  and  C41. 2.  Expressing mathematics in h 
2.1.  Translation of a text 
There is a standard way, in a sense natural, for translating mathematical 
texts into A.  We shall comment on the principles of this manner of 
translating. The idea is,  that a mathematical text transforms into a long- 
drawn term of A.  Not only mathematical entities such as sets and functions, 
present in the original text, become subterms of this term, but also text 
units such as theorems and assumptions havetheir  direct counterparts in 
subterms. The order of the text units in the original reasoning is generally 
maintained in the translation. 
For obtaining a term of A, having no free variables, one should in 
principle have a text that is complete in a double meaning: the text should 
not have gaps in the reasoning or argumentation,  and all foreknowledge 
(axioms,  theorems, definitions used in the text) must be explicitly given. 
In practice one only translates a portion of text when all foreknowledge is 
accessible in translated form, so that the text under consideration becomes, 
after translation, a mere extension of an already existing (possibly  very 
long) A-term. 
We shall now discuss a possible way of translating some mathematical 
notions or text units. 
2.2.  Sets and propositions 
Our  (long)  A-term opens with two subterms:  (A  )  and (AT). We think of T 
T 
as being the class of all sets,  and a as being the class of all propositions. 
If we wish to express, somewhere in the translation, that variable s 
must denote a set, we write  (TX~)  in our A-term. Then ~ypcs  1 E  T,  in 
correspondence  with our interpretation  of T and of Typ. Analogously, if we 
wish to regard variable p as a proposition, we write  (TX  ). 
P 
An element x of set  s may now be introduced by embodying the subterm 
(SX )  in our term. For the analogous subterm (pXt),  where p is a proposition, 
X 
there is a nice and practical interpretation: t is a proof of p.  (This  so- 
called propositions-as-types  notion has fairly recently been introduced by 
several investigators,  among others De Bruijn; for comment,  see C41). 
In this manner one obtains interpretations for four different grades of 
terms. The 0-grade only contains the empty term, to be interpreted as the 
class of all classes. The 1-grade contains T,  the class of all sets, and n, the class of all propositions. The sets and the propositions themselves can 
be found in the 2-grade. Finally, the 3-grade contains elements of sets and 
proofs of propositions. 
Hence, if X is an element (or  proof) in the 3-grade,  then TYPCXI  is a 
2  set (or proposition) in the 2-grade, Typ [XI  is T  (or T  respectively) and 
3  Typ [XI  is the empty term. It is striking that we only need these four grades 
for representing a large section of mathematics, although A  has possibilities 
for arbitrary n-grades (n  being a non-negative number). 
2.3.  Functions 
It is convenient to use the functional structure of lambda-calculus in 
describing functions. For example, the identity function on A can obtain the 
term  (AX  )x as its counterpart in A.  We take the term  (AX  )A  as type of 
X  A  X 
this function, usually  written  A .   his interpretation of (Ahx)A is not 
self-evident,  but such a type-valued  function is, again, very practical in 
use. We note that this policy corresponds with the formal identity 
Typ(AAx)x 5  (AX  )A.  For further explanation, see C41. 
X 
Following the above convention concerning type-valued functions,  there 
is a plausible interpretation for the term  (pX )q, where p and q are  t 
propositions, viz.:  p -  q. This can be understood as follows. If u is a 
proof of q (so  ~ypru]  z  q according to the propositions-as-types notion), 
then function (pX )u conveys any proof t of p into proof u of q. Hence  (pX )u  t  t 
proves the implication p =+  q, so that the type of (pX )u  must be p 19  q.  But  t 
TWC  (pht)ul  is (pX )q, so the latter represents the implication.  t 
Analogously, term  (AX )q,  where A embodies a set and q a proposition, 
X 
represents: V  CqJ.  Here q is a term that may contain the free variable x.  xc A 
2.4.  Assumptions and introductions 
The text unit "Let  x c  A" introduces a variable x of type A.  In 
translation this becomes (AX ). Analogously, the assumption "Assume p" can 
X 
be translated by  (pit). Note that the latter mode of translation is in 
accordance with the propositions-as-types notion: the subterm (pX 1  can be  t 
read as: "Let t be a proof of proposition p". 2.5.  Axioms, axiomatic notions 
Axioms and axiomatic notions may be regarded as introductions (or 
assumptions) with an unbound validity range. For example, the primitive 
notion "natural number" can be introduced by means of the subterm  (TX  1.  nr 
The first Peano axiom, "1 is a natural number", reads:  (NX  , and so on. 
2.6.  Definitions 
When object a of class fi  is abbreviated by variable x, then it is to be 
understood that each occurrence of x "means" a. This is essentially what the 
definition x :=  a does. Let A and B be translations into A  of a and 6. Then 
we can write the definition in translation as (A&)  (BXx), since 6-reduction 
enables us to again replace by A every x bound by this A.  Moreover, by 
strong  functionality both A and x must have type (convertible  to) B.  These 
observations imply that the effect of the insertion of (A&)  (BX )  is that x 
X 
"means" A. 
2.7.  Theorems, lemmas and intermediate results 
In translating theorems, we lean heavily on the propositions-as-types 
notion. Let B be the translation of a proposition that we regard as a 
theorem, and let  A  be the translation of its proof. Then we may insert the 
subterm (AG)  (BA ),  expressing both the theorem and its proof. By strong  t 
functionality,  TY~CAI  - B, in accordance with "A proves B". Variable t may 
be regarded as a name of the proof A.  Theorem B may later be applied by 
referring to its proof, which can be done by calling the name t of the proof. 
Lemmas and intermediate results may be treated analogously. 
2.8.  Deduction rules and logic 
We shall briefly comment on the way in which logic can be incorporated. 
By introducing an axiomatic notion "contradiction": (nhcd)  , we can express 
the negation 7 p of proposition p as p *  cd,  or, in translation:  (pAt)cd. 
The logical connectives A,  v  etc. now can be expressed by means of the 
implication and the negation. 
The universal quantifier is already "present" in A,  as we saw in 2.3. 
The existential quantifier 3 then can be easily expressed as 7  V  1. The elimination and introduction rules of natural deduction now are 
implicitly present in the system. They are a result of the natural language 
structure,  and need not be introduced as primitive rules or axioms. See 
also C71. 
When wishing to apply classical logic,  one adds the double negation 
rule: 7-1 p *  p as an axiom. 
2.9.  Remarks on some translation difficulties 
There are a number of pecularities that hamper the translation of a 
mathematical text into A.  We mention a few.  (For  more extensive comments on 
these topics, see C51 and C41.I 
(1) The system A has "uniqueness of types". That is to say: if A 
converts to B, then ~ypC~1  converts to T~~CBI.  This presents practical 
difficulties as to the hierarchy of types. For example, if x is a natural 
number, then x is not automatically a real number as well, since IN  and lR 
are obviously non-convertible. A way out is to write in A a mechanism of 
embedding and "exbedding",  to enable us to deal with sets and subsets. 
(2)  Two proofs of a certain statement are in principle different. This 
gives undesirable effects in the case in which only the existence of a proof 
matters, not its nature. For example, the natural logarithm Rn will have two 
arguments in A:  a number x, and a proof s thatthisnumber is positive. So in 
fact we should not write  Rn x, but Rn(x,s).  If s and t are two different 
proofs of the positiveness of x, however, then nevertheless Rn(x,s) and 
Rn(x,t) should be "equal". One can write in A an axiom yielding such an 
"irrelevance of proofs" in these cases. 
(3) In A there is no primitive equality, apart from conversion. So some 
forms of equality  (e.g. between sets,  and between numbers) have to be 
expressed axiomatically. This treatment of equality is in principle feasible, 
but in practice somewhat cumbersome. 
(4)  When A is used in the form as described above, it gives rise to 
numerous repetitions inside the A-term. See the example in section 3.2. 
Front parts of subterms are often repeated; they are subterms themselves, 
but since they end in the empty term, they cannot  be abbreviated as is done 
with definitions(cf. section 2.6).  It is not hard, however, to extend A in 
such a manner that the abbreviations meant can be carried out. 3.  An  approach  to theorem proving on  the basis of  h 
3.1.  The  shape of a translated mathematical  text 
When  following the translation conventions discussed in section 2, one 
obtains a single A-term  that may  be  considered a concatenation of fragments. 
Each  fragment is a subterm ending in the empty term.  There are three kinds 
of  fragments : 
1.  the initial fragments,  which  stand at  the heading of the term,  namely 
(AT)  and  (Av), 
2.  primitive  fragments of  the form  (AX  ) , A  being a 1-  or 2-grade  term 
P 
(see section 2.2) , 
3.  stating fragments of  the form  (A&)  (BXx),  B  being a 1-  or 2-grade  term. 
The role of  the initial fragments  will be clear. The  primitive  fragments 
are the translations of  axioms  and axiomatic notions.  The  stating fragments 
are translations of  theorems,  lemmas,  intermediate results, but also of 
definitions. 
3.2.  Example  of  a text in 
As an example  we  render  the first few  lines of Jutting's complete 
translation of  Landau's  "Grundlagen"  (see C51).  Jutting's  translation is in 
Automath;  we  give the A-version.  For  reasons of economy  (cf. section 2.9, 
note  (4)) we  draw  a line when  a repetition is meant.  E.g.,  the fourth line 
in the subjoined A-text  should read  ((nX ) (ah )a1  ). Numbers  1 to 11 are 
a  b  imp 
extra-textual,  only meant  for numbering  the fragments.  The  A-text  below, 
read uninterruptedly,  yields a single A-term.  The  content of each fragment 
will  be  explained afterwards. 
4.  ( (vh  ) (nh  ) (nh  )  ( (b6)  (as)  imp  hi)  ( (c6)  (b6)  imp  A,)  (ahx)  ( (x6)i6)  16) 
ab  c Fragments  1  and  2  are initial fragments,  and  10  are primitive 
fragments.  The  others are stating fragments,  where  3, 6  and 7  concern 
definitions;  4,  8,  9  and 11 may  be  regarded as theorems. 
The  content of the fragments is the following.  Fragments  1 and  2  need 
no comment.  In 3  the implication is defined  (see also section 2.31,  4  states 
the transitivity of implication.  In 5  contradiction is introduced as an 
axiomatic notion.  Fragment 6  defines negation  (see also section 2.81,  7  the 
double negation.  In 8  the theorem is proved that a  1  -,  a holds;  9  states, 
as an  axiom,  the double negation rule.  Fragment  10 proves  the falsum- 
principle.  In 11,  finally,  the logical theorem 7  a  (a  b) is proved. 
The  construction of a proof 
We  ignore the proof given in the first part of fragment  11  (previous 
section), and try to construct a proof  independently.  In this construction 
we  follow a strictly formal approach;  we  do  not appeal to any mathematical 
insight.  To  begin with,  we  transform the text above  into normal  form.  This 
is, of  course,  a crude and inefficient thing to do,  especially for longer 
A-texts,  but we  obtain so doing a  clearer view on  the principles of proving. 
Fragments  1  to 10 transform into the normal  A-term: 
(AT)  (A  )  (nh  ( (rXa)  ( ( (ah  ) cdXx) cdXw)  ahdn) , consisting of  four primitive  r  cd  Y 
fragments.  Now  a proof  of the theorem has to  be a term  with type  (converting 
to) Y,  where  Y  -=  (nh  (TTX  ((a1  )cdXn) (ah  )b, which  is the normal  form  ab  x  X 0 
obtained from  the term expressing the theorem: 
(rXa)  (nhb)  ( (a6)not  An)  (b6)  (a61  imp. We  can  describe the actual proving state as follows:  on  one hand we 
have a  stock of  variables and matching  types,  on  the other hand  there is a 
target,  determined by one or more  types.  In our case,  we  have  the following 
initial proving state: the stock consists of  the "leading variables" of  the 
four primitive fragments,  namely  T, n,  cd and  dn,  together with their 
types;  the target is to find a term with type  (converting to) Y. 
In view  of the shape of  Y,  it is appropriate to change the proving 
state: add a, b,  n and xO  to the stock, with types as above,  and change  the 
target into a term  X  with type  (converting to) b.  None  of  the variables in 
the stock has a  type that is b,  converts to  b,  or ends in b.  As to all 
stock-variables  except dn,  there is no  way  of changing the final variable 
of their types  into b  by  reductions.  Only  dn  can give us hope:  the final a 
of its type is "internally bound",  i.e.:  bound  by  a  A  that occurs inside the 
same  fragment;  so variable a  can possibly be changed  into b. 
Hence  we  now  direct our searching attempts at  dn and,  again,we  change 
the proving  state. We  look  for terms  X  and  X  (the new  targets) such that  1  2 
(X  6) (x 6)dn has a type  (converting to) b.  Then  X  must  have  type  r and  X  2  1  1  2 
must  have  type  ( (X  X  )cdh )cd, according to strong functionality. Now 
lY  x 
Typ[(X26) (x16)dnl E  Xl,  as can be easily computed,  so X  must  be b.  The  1 
remaining target is an X2  with type  (converting to) Y  =  ((bA )cdA  )cd.  2 -  YX 
In view  of  the shape of  Y2,  we  add x to the stock of variables, with 
its type:  (bX  )cd. Now  the target becomes  a term  X  with type cd.  The  only 
Y  2  1 
possibilities are to use dn,  n or x  from  the stock.  We  choose to use n and 
have  to find an  XZll  such that (X2116)n has type cd.  Then  X211  must  have 
type a,  and,  indeed,  X211  :=  xO  does the job. 
Thus  we  have  reached  the final proving state, in which  no  target is 
left. Recapitulating:  we found X 211  5  a;  X21  Z  (X2116)n Wx06)n; 
X2  5  ( (bX  cdX  )X  X  r  b and  X  Z  (x 6)  (X  6)  dn. The  requested proof  is  y  x  21;  1  2  1 
(nXa) (nXb) ((aXx)cdXn)  (aAxO)X. Inspection shows  that we have  found  the "same" 
proof  as given in fragment  11  of  the example  in section 3.2  when  written in 
normal  form. 
There were  only a  few  choices to be made  in this simple proving problem. 
Yet,  if we  had  chosen to use dn  instead of  n,  when  looking for X  we would 
21' 
have  returned to a prior proving state. Hence,  in principle we  could have 
been  caught in a  loop. 3.4.  -  Remarksonpartial theorem proving on the basis of A 
A general strategy for theorem proving on the basis of normal forms can 
easily be derived from the construction example above. This n0YWaZ  strategy 
does indeed work in uncomplicated cases,  but it fails when major mathematical 
tools are needed, such as induction. In such cases there is,  presumably, only 
hope for a mechanical theorem prover when it is built in an interactive way: 
the theorem prover must be able to react to hints from the human textwriter. 
For general use one has to abandon the transformation into normal form. 
The normal proving strategy, as explained above, can however be adapted for 
non-normal A-texts, such as given in section 3.2.  The strategy itself then 
becomes more complicated. It is, for instance, not sufficient to regard the 
final variable of a certain "type-term",  but one also has to consider all 
variables that can possibly replace this variable when reductions are 
applied. This leads to the tracing of certain chains of variables. The 
comparison of variables, being a major activity in the normal strategy,  then 
has to be replaced by a method of comparing variable chains. 
Summarizing, there appear to be possiblities for partial  theorem 
proving on the basis of A, in particular when small gaps have to be bridged. 
For exacting proofs, however, a form of interaction between man and machine 
appears indispensable. References 
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Weak  functionality 
We  define the norm  (the "functional skeleton")  11 A 11  of a term A  by  the 
following partial definition: 
(i) the norm  of  the empty term is the empty term;  if x  is a variable and 
I1 ~ypCxl  ll  exists, then 11 x 11  :  =  II TY~CXI  11; 
(ii)  if A  and B  are terms  for which  II A  11  and  11  B 11  exist, then 
11  (AXx)BII :=  (IIAlhX) 11B11; 
if, moreover  11~11 :  (IIAllix)~, then  11  (A~)BII  :=  D. 
If  11~11  exists for some  term  A,  then IIAll  is a term as well, without  free 
variables.  There are no  6's in  11~11. The  essential step in norm  calculation 
is the cancellation of adjacent pairs  (BG)(CX  )  when  some  weak  functional 
X 
condition is obeyed  as to "argument"  B  and "domain"  C.  This condition is 
expressed in the second part of (ii).  The calculation sf  the norm  of A 
breaks off prematurely  (and A  has no  norm),  or terminates  in a unique norm 
11 A  11. 
We  say that a closed term F is weakly  functional if  IlFII  exists. It is 
not hard to  prove that strongly functional terms are weakly  functional as 
well. 